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INDIAINI'S RULE 13

'THE KILLY-100
BIRD OF THE
LCGI LWORLD
f

Rule 13 is an Indiana development having relatively
little to do with the improvement of professional
skills. Because it contains little to commend it to other
jurisdictions, there is good reason to believe that it
will not spread beyond the borders of Indiana.
Defensive in origin and negative in outlook, Rule 13
confuses useful information with essential knowledge.
Too much that is important is omitted from the rule.'
The de facto specialization of a substantial portion
of the organized bar is ignored. Progress in legal
education is inhibited and there are certain heavy

BY DOUGLSSG.DOSIROFF
Professor andformer Dean, Indiana University
School of Law, Bloomington

NINETEEN

costs associated with the rule that will become painfully apparent as the years pass.
Rule 13 was instituted following substantial criticism by the State Board of Law Examiners for a pass
rate of 75 percent on the July 1973 bar examination.
Indiana had traditionally had a high pass rate, often
around 90 percent. Students and bar examiners
sought an explanation for the drastic change. Both
groups blamed course selection. This rationale offered
students an excuse which did not reflect on their
intellectual skills and gave the bar examiners an
explanation other than the unpopular one that standards had been raised.
Rule 13 was formulated without any systematic
study of student bar examination performance. In
an article published in the Journal of Legal Education, we have argued that the bar examiners had no
justification for concluding that the failure to take
certain courses had an adverse effect on bar examination performance. Even if this argument is not
persuasive, it must be recognized that Rule 13 equates
professional competence with bar examination performance. It is likely that many other jurisdictions will
look further in seeking a definition of professional
distinction.
The most disturbing characteristic of Rule 13 is
its terrible negativism. One usually thinks of educational reform proposals in a positive sense: there are
new needs to be met. Rule 13 does not have this affirmative element. It directs us to go back in time, to
stop changing. It has attracted widespread support
in Indiana because it prevents progress and controls
the supposedly radical element in legal education.
Prescribing two thirds of the law school curriculum,
it has had an adverse effect on student course selection. Many important subject matter areas and practice skills (including a course thought important by
the Clare Committee) are not found in Rule 13. What
is omitted is just as significant as what is included. Experiment and incremental change in legal education

are inhibited. Development of clinical legal education opportunities becomes much more difficult under
the Indiana rule. Nobody has ever suggested that most
of the prescribed courses are not important. But so
are many other courses which Rule 13 excludes.
Rule 13 confuses important information with essential knowledge. Any fragment of legal knowledge
is absolutely essential to the lawyer who needs to use
it. Law schools attempt to meet such situational needs
by offering a wide variety of electives. There is relatively little we teach which must be mastered by every
student who wishes to become a competent practitioner. I believe that prior to the adoption of Rule 13
law schools were doing a good job of conveying to
students those items of universally essential information which do not derive importance from specific
practice opportunities. The Rule now directs law
schools to concentrate on information which one
group of lawyers believes is important.
Once the practicing bar grasps the distinction between important and essential information, the philosophical weakness of the Indiana rule is revealed. I
predict a rapid development of practitioner sophistication as proposals for mandatory continuing legal
education proliferate. Minnesota recently adopted
MCLE.
We are told, however, that: "The Minnesota rule
requires no specific subjects in which courses must
be taken. The matter was discussed, but the final
conclusion was that individuals will normally enroll
in subjects that have the greatest appeal and value
to them which, in most instances, will also be those
areas of the law in which most of their practice occurs.
There was also recognition of the fact that the varieties of practice are so great that it would be virtually
impossible to identify a core of essentials that everyone ought to have."
These are exactly the same arguments that have
been advanced by law professors favoring a more
comprehensive elective legal education program.
i

COMPCTCNCY
(Continuedfrom page 16)
He began by asking two questions: why had several
persons failed the bar examination and written with
little competency? Why had some of those persons
expressed to him great bitterness at the law schools
from which they had graduated?
He found, after analyzing the results of 200 bar
examination papers, that many of the examinees had
not taken courses in the subjects in which they were
being tested. If they had, the courses were all too often
non-courses. The result was a kind of charade: course
titles might be familiar (e.g., evidence, procedure or
contracts), but course content bore small resemblance
to reality.
When the court's attention was directed to this
development by the board and its president, members
of the court began their own exploration into the

matter. We discovered that a student, who can express himself rather well on a written examination,
may indeed pass the bar examination without taking
some subjects in law school, because cumulative
grading is used in the examination, i.e., failure is not
contingent on passing all sections of the examination.
Due to this discovery, it was clear that our court
might be certifying persons to practice law in Indiana
and for the federal judiciary in Indiana, who were not,
in fact, prepared to give the effective legal assistance
to which their clients were entitled-whether in civil
or criminal matters or cases.
ASSURING CITIZENS OF GOOD COUNSEL
Our breadth of concern covered not only trial and
appellate advocacy but reached to every level of the
law practice. One graduate, when asked why he did
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